The Syrian parliamentary elections held on 5 October 2025 were presented by the Syrian Transitional Government (STG) under Ahmad al-Sharaa as a step toward institutional stabilization and political legitimization. In practice, however, they functioned as a controlled political mechanism designed to consolidate power rather than to establish democratic representation. The electoral system was widely criticized for its indirect delegate-based structure, executive domination, and severely restricted political competition. Kurdish, Assyrian, and other political actors in North and East Syria described the process as a mechanism of imposed legitimacy rather than democratic transition.
Political context: power consolidation under regional pressure
Since the October 2025 elections, Syria’s political order has undergone rapid transformation under conditions of military pressure, fragmented sovereignty, and external geopolitical involvement.
From early 2026 onward, shifting regional power constellations — including negotiations involving the United States, Turkey, and Israel — contributed to the start of the liquidation of authority in North and East Syria. These dynamics were not neutral stabilisation processes, but part of a broader struggle over influence, territorial control, and post-war political ordering.
The Arab-Kurdish political arrangement associated with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and allied local structures weakened under sustained pressure. The SDF withdrew from several urban centres, while the central authority in Damascus expanded its reach into formerly semi-autonomous regions.
On 30 January 2026, the SDF and the HTS-led transitional authorities announced an agreement opening the path toward gradual integration of formerly autonomous institutions into Syrian state structures.
Parallel to these developments, economic agreements and reconstruction frameworks signalled an accelerated neoliberal restructuring of the Syrian economy. In this context, parliamentary institutions appear less as instruments of democratization than as part of a broader project of political consolidation, economic reordering, and international normalization of the emerging regime architecture.
The electoral system: centralized control and managed representation
The elections of 5 October 2025 were conducted through a tightly controlled indirect system designed to manage rather than open political participation.
Out of 210 parliamentary seats, 70 seats (one third of parliament) were directly appointed by transitional president Ahmad al-Sharaa, embedding executive authority directly into the legislative structure. The remaining 140 seats were filled through an indirect delegate system, excluding any form of universal suffrage.
The Supreme Electoral Commission, composed of eleven members, functioned as the highest electoral authority. Al-Sharaa himself was a member of this body and appointed its remaining ten members. The commission established local electoral committees across the country.
Eligibility rules required candidates to prove they had neither served in the former Baath regime nor opposed the transitional authorities. Critics argued that these criteria institutionalized political exclusion by reclassifying dissent as “extremism,” “separatism,” or “terrorism,” thereby narrowing the political field in advance of any vote.
Local committees selected 6,050 delegates, who were responsible for electing parliamentary representatives. The system was officially described as comprising 70% professionals and 30% local notables, though this composition could not be independently verified. There were no direct elections involving the general population.
Results and uneven territorial implementation
While 140 seats were designated for election, not all were filled in the initial phase due to delays and political fragmentation in non-government-controlled areas.
In Suweida (mainly Druze populated), where political authority remained contested, the allocated three parliamentary seats remained vacant. In other regions outside full central control, electoral implementation was delayed or selectively applied.
In areas formerly governed by the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES), indirect elections were postponed and later implemented in phases during March 2026, including Tabqa, Raqqa, and Tal Abyad.
This uneven implementation further underscored the fragmented and negotiated nature of the post-2025 political order.
Elections in North and East Syria: contested legitimacy
The delegate-based elections in Kurdish-majority regions — including Kobanê, Hesekê, Derik, and Qamishlo — were conducted in delayed phases and faced significant criticism.
The PYD (Democratic Union Party, political party of Rojava) initially considered participation but ultimately boycotted the process. PYD representative Aldar Khalil stated that the boycott did not reject elections in principle but opposed a system that structurally failed to guarantee fair representation. He particularly criticized unequal seat allocation in Hasakah and the systematic underrepresentation of Kurdish political forces.
The Assyrian Union Party also rejected the process in Hesekê, arguing that it ignored the region’s ethnic and religious plurality and failed to ensure meaningful representation for the Syriac-Assyrian community and other Christian groups.
Beyond organized parties, parts of the population expressed skepticism toward the delegate-based system, citing the absence of direct participation, lack of transparency, and unclear mechanisms of representation.
Women’s political dimension and structural exclusion
PYD co-chair of Kobanê, Bêrîvan Îsmaîl, also criticized the establishment of the Syrian People’s Council as undemocratic. She argued that neither Kurds nor women were adequately represented in the process.
Îsmaîl emphasized that women had played a central role in shaping the political development of North and East Syria, stating that the region’s transformation could not be understood without their organizational contribution. Referring to the Rojava Revolution as “a women’s revolution,” she argued that the exclusion of women from political decision-making undermined the legitimacy of the entire electoral process.
Results in Kurdish-majority regions
The elections in North and East Syria were completed through delayed local delegate votes following the nationwide process.
In Hasakah province, the process was divided into Hasakah city, Qamishli, and Derik districts. In Hasakah city, 150 delegates voted among thirteen candidates for three seats. In Qamishli, 198 delegates elected four representatives from seven candidates.
In Derik, two candidates ran for two seats, so no vote count was necessary; in total, five Arabs and four Kurds were elected in the region, including two representatives of the ENKS and two independent Kurdish candidates.
According to the published results, Ridwan Sîdo, Ebdulhelîm Elî, Kîm Îbrahîm, and Mehmûd Madî were elected to the People’s Council in Qamişlo. In Hesekê, Îbrahîm El Hebeş, Umer El Hayîs, and Fesla Yûsif were selected.
Kobanê was assigned to the Aleppo electoral district, where 100 delegates voted for two seats among twelve candidates. The elected representatives were Kurdish candidate Farhad Anwar Shahin and Shawakh Ibrahim al-Assaf. Official results provided ethnic classification but limited transparency regarding political affiliation.
Three additional Kurdish representatives from Afrin had already been elected during the October phase: Rangin Mohammed (Rankin Muhammad Abdo), Mohammed Sido, and Sheikh Saeed Zada, largely listed as independent candidates.
Overall, Kurdish representation emerged through fragmented electoral phases rather than a unified democratic process, reflecting the broader logic of managed political inclusion under transitional rule.
The composition of the 70 presidentially appointed members remains unclear, including whether meaningful representation of Kurdish, Assyrian, Druze, or Alawite communities will be included within this bloc.
