In January of this year, the Syrian army and its allies launched a large-scale offensive against the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria. The offensive was preceded by a meeting between Turkey, Israel, and the United States in Paris. The purpose of the meeting was to resolve the differences between Turkey and Israel regarding the future of Syria, under the auspices of their common partner, the United States.
The aim of the attack was to dismantle all of the achievements and structures of the autonomous administration. The SDF, as the armed force of the autonomous administration, withdrew into the Kurdish cities and lost very large parts of its territory. The awakening of Kurdish national consciousness across all parts of Kurdistan led Kurds to willingly make their way to the region to come to the aid of the Rojava Revolution.
This dynamic, combined with worldwide solidarity with the Kurdish people under siege and the progressive character of the revolution, ultimately resulted in the SDF not being dismantled, but instead being slated to remain in the form of brigades stationed in the Kurdish cities. As recently as January 18, Ahmad al-Shara had demanded the complete capitulation of the SDF and Rojava. Following the developments described above, and in view of the determination of the Kurdish population to defend the Kurdish cities to the very end, the agreement of January 29, 2026, was reached.
Since then, a process has been underway that is often referred to as “integration.” The real question, however, is: Does it actually contain what the label promises?
What has happened since then?
Under the January 29 agreement, all structures and institutions of the autonomous administration, as well as border crossings and oil refineries, are to be handed over to the central government in Damascus. In addition, the SDF is supposed to be stationed in the Kurdish cities of the Cizîre Canton and in Kobanê in the form of four brigades. Each of these brigades consists of approximately 1,300 fighters.
At the end of August, Mazlum Abdi finally announced that the SDF, which once inflicted the Islamic State’s first military defeat, had been dissolved as a separate military force. Abdi has since taken on a new political role: he is set to serve as an adviser to Syrian President Ahmad al-Shara. The US Special Envoy for Syria and Iraq, Tom Barrack, welcomed the dissolution of the SDF with the words: “This is what real integration looks like.”
The question that remains the elephant in the room is the future of the YPJ (Women’s Protection Units). The YPJ fighters, who became the nightmare of the so-called Islamic State on the front lines, have no place in the patriarchal worldview of al-Shara and his allies and are therefore, ideally, to be dissolved. The YPJ, as well as Kurds and supporters around the world, are demanding that it be maintained at all costs. This is why the “We are all YPJ” campaign has been running for months, with countless women around the world joining it.
After all, the events of January this year once again demonstrated in a devastating way what the marauding sleeper cells of the Islamic State and the Islamist forces that fought against the Kurds are capable of. The body of Asayîş fighter Deniz Ciya (whose legal name was Deniz Kirdeli) was desecrated and thrown into the street from a building. These images have been burned into the minds of women. Negotiations are currently underway over whether the YPJ can remain in the Kurdish cities as an anti-terrorism unit under the Ministry of Interior. At the same time, developments elsewhere demonstrate how little space the new Syrian leadership is actually willing to grant women. The Ministry of Defense categorically does not want women in its ranks. The question of the future of the YPJ therefore does not stand in isolation; rather, it is part of a broader development in which independent forms of women’s organization are being pushed back. The autonomous administration’s existing women’s structures are also affected by this process. Parts of the women’s offices and their structures have already been integrated into the Ministry of Family. Independent women’s institutions are thus gradually being incorporated into state structures. While the leadership of the former autonomous administration is fulfilling its obligations one after another, we are witnessing, on the other side, how Ahmad al-Shara and his government are moving only extremely slowly — if they are moving at all.
Many of the demands put forward by the Kurds have yet to be met. These include, for example, the demand to change Syria’s official designation as the “Syrian Arab Republic,” since this name excludes entire groups such as Kurds, Druze, and Armenians. Mazlum Abdi and Ilham Ahmed have also repeatedly called for the rights of Kurds and other minorities to be constitutionally protected.
So far, these demands have not been addressed. The cultural dimension has been of particular importance — above all, education in one’s mother tongue. One of the achievements of the Democratic Autonomous Administration was that Kurds, as well as other minorities, were guaranteed education in their mother tongue under its former constitution, the 2023 Social Contract. Now, however, Kurds are reportedly to receive only three to four hours of Kurdish-language instruction per week, with the exact number varying slightly depending on the source.
This policy of Damascus has caused considerable controversy. Kurds immediately launched a school strike, which subsequently spread throughout the Kurdish regions. There also continues to be a hostile attitude toward Kurds in Syria. During the Kurdish New Year celebrations of Newroz in March, there were increased attacks on Kurdish women who were celebrating in Kurdish flags and traditional clothing. Kurds who had been displaced from their homes have also come under attack by mercenaries who refuse to return confiscated apartments and houses to their rightful owners. There have been attacks on returning residents such as in Serekaniye, which has led to their return being put on hold for the time being.
The 26-year-old Kurdish soldier Samî Şêxmûs Hiso, known as Sîpan Hiznî, was abducted in Hesekê and brutally killed on the road toward Dêrazor. According to reports, he was killed with a sharp object and subsequently shot on 11.09.2026, while the perpetrators allegedly filmed the crime and distributed the footage. Several suspects have reportedly been arrested, with a possible involvement of members of the Arab Al-Baggara tribe under investigation; no group has so far claimed responsibility. The killing was followed by numerous protests in Kurdish-majority areas, where reports indicate that people were also injured and killed.
Integration — or Dictate?
Looking at the overall course of the integration process, it becomes unmistakably clear that Ahmad al-Shara is determined to undo all the achievements of the revolution. Because these achievements have found their way into the hearts of Kurds, different peoples, and progressive forces, al-Shara has to perform a balancing act: he seeks to implement this project in a veiled manner while simultaneously keeping the Kurdish population calm and preventing it from turning against him.
Al-Shara is determined to maintain stability in Syria. He cannot afford another open conflict with the Kurds. This explains his retreat from the plan to give Kurdish cities Arabic names after Kurds took to the streets in protest. Above all, he wants to avoid such a conflict because the future of the antagonistic Druze communities in the south also remains unresolved. In addition, he wants to project an image of a stable Syria to the outside world, among other things so that the potential return of Syrian refugees (from Germany, for example) can become a matter for negotiation. Fig leaves such as the presidential decree issued in January, which defines Kurdish as a national language, are nowhere near sufficient to speak of an integration of the autonomous administration. The defining characteristics of Rojava are gradually being erased, while the demands of the Kurds are casually dismissed. The continued existence of autonomous women’s structures, the official preservation of the YPJ, cultural equality, a constitutional status for the Kurds, and the renaming of the “Syrian Arab Republic” are indispensable steps if this is to be considered equal integration. Everything else consists merely of temporary measures that could be revoked tomorrow by Ahmad al-Shara, who is concentrating power in his own hands.
Recognizing Kurdish as a language by decree means little if Kurdish-language education is reduced to just a few hours per week — and even then only as an elective subject. The same applies to all other measures as long as they are not firmly enshrined in a new constitution. What is happening at present is merely a drop in the ocean.
We are watching the integration process with grave concern in light of the shortcomings and imbalances outlined above.
The Kurdish people cannot and will not accept such an unjust form of integration. Through their boycotts and protests, the people of Rojava are showing that they still carry within them the political and ideological experiences of the Rojava Revolution.
